CIA or CEO: Who Will be Responsible for Helping Protect National Security? by Crandal, Jamie Elizabeth
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
All Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
5-2017 
CIA or CEO: Who Will be Responsible for Helping Protect National 
Security? 
Jamie Elizabeth Crandal 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd 
 Part of the International Business Commons, and the Management Sciences and Quantitative 
Methods Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Crandal, Jamie Elizabeth, "CIA or CEO: Who Will be Responsible for Helping Protect National Security?" 
(2017). All Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 6829. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/6829 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Theses and 
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
CIA OR CEO: WHO WILL BE RESPONSILBLE FOR HELPING 
PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY? 
Approved: 
Thesis/Project Advisor 
Dr. Shannon Peterson 
Honors Program Director 
Dr. Kristine Miller 
by 
Jamie Elizabeth Crandal 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
HONORS IN UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
WITH DEPARTMENTAL HONORS 
in 
International Business 
in the Department of Management 
Committee Member 
Profe ssor John Ferguson 
Departmental Honors Advisor 
Dr. Shannon Peterson 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
Logan, UT 
Spring 2017 
© 2017 Jamie Crandal 
All Rights Reserved 
ABSTRACT 
As technology advances businesses are being called upon to take an active role in helping protect 
national security. A variety of different companies and industries within the private sector, which 
are at the forefront of encryption and hacking technologies, have the option to aid or subvert the 
intelligence community by sharing breakthrough technology in the interest of helping ensure 
domestic tranquility. 
Many industries and companies within the private sector argue that while they are not 
actively trying to subvert eff011s to protect national security it is not in their best interest , or the 
best interest of their customers, to hand over proprietary technology to the intelligence 
community through government enforcement of a court order. As a result of the intelligence 
community's need for assistance from the private sector and the private sectors refusal to provide 
aid, both parties have turned to the courts for adjudication of the issue. 
The ensuing legal battle over this question of who is responsible for protecting national 
security will forever change the relationship between the private sector and intelligence . Has the 
nature of national security been fundamentally changed as the result of technology and our 
information society? More specifically, is the intelligence community and other governmental 
agencies solely responsible for protecting national security? Or, in an age of globalization , has 
national security become the burden of both public and private actors? 
The answers to these questions are complex and at the same time straightforward. What 
was discovered was that while the burden of national security falls to both the public and private 
sector to an extent. However , it is not the responsibility of the private sector to help protect 
national security by virtue of providing the intelligence community with proprietary technology 
or information that could compromise the integrity of a given companies business. Furthermore , 
I. 
the fight to protect national security is important, living in a country that provides certain safety 
assurances helps businesses grow; but when providing that safety prevents people from living 
their lives or businesses from operating at their full potential the enemy that the intelligence 
community is trying to protect us from has already won. 
In developing the answers to these questions, this paper takes a broad view of the players 
involved as well as both sides of the legal battle that has already begun. will end with a 
discus sion of the options and opportunities that will be available to both parties as the battle over 
who should be responsible for helping protect our national security moves forward in the comts. 
11. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On December 2, 2015 fourteen people were killed and twenty-two people were injured 
when Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik opened fire at a holiday party in San Bernardino 
California. 1 Farook and Malik were killed in a battle with police following the attack, however, 
during the subsequent investigation it became necessary for law enforcement officials from the 
FBI to obtain a search warrant that resulted in the discovery of an Apple iPhone belonging to 
Farook. 
That cellphone was locked , the FBI did not have the password , and it did not have the 
ability or the technology to unlock the phone. As a result , the FBI sought the assistance of Apple. 
Apple uses a high-level encryption software that makes it "near[ly] impossible for the FBI or 
Apple or anyone else (except the phone owner) to crack the password." 2 Apple claims that it uses 
this level of encryption to protect the privacy of its customers. A statement from Apple reads , 
"For many years, we have used encryption to protect our customers' personal data because we 
believe it's the only way to keep their information safe ... We have even put that data out of our 
own reach, because we believe the content s of your iPhone are none of our business. "3 What 
makes this case unique from other cases where law enforcement has sought help from third 
parties is that Apple doesn't currently have the means to help. Because of commitment to data 
privacy , they do not have the code to unlock the phone. The Justice Department was seeking to 
compel Apple to "write special software that will override those encrypt ion features in order to 
1 
"San Bernardin o Shoo ting Updates." Los Angeles Times . December 9 , 2015. Accessed May 02 , 20 17 . 
http://www.la ti mes .com/local /lanow/la-me -l n-san-bernarcl i no-shoot i ng-1 i ve- u pda tes- html story .html . 
~ Roberts, Jeff John. "Apple vs. the FBr: An Explanation of the Lega l Iss ues ." Does the FBI Have a Strong Legal 
Case Against Appl e? Here's an Ana lys is I Fortun e.com. Feb ruary 20, 20 16. Acces sed May 02, 2017. 
http: //for tune.co m/2016 /02/ l 8/fbi- iphone / . 
3 
"Cu stomer Lette r." Apple. Apple, 16 Feb.2016 . Web . 02 May 2017. <http s://www.a pp le.com /customer- letter /> . 
3 
peer into the iPhone used by one of the San Bernardino terrorists. "4 If law enforcement were to 
try and extract the information without the software the contents of the phone would be erased 
and investigators would lose any potential evidence that may or may not be on the phone. 
When App le refused to comply with requests from the FBI , prosecutors from the Justice 
Department brought an additional order to the original search warrant before the Central District 
Court of California. Followin g the submission of briefs , "in an unusuall y detailed directive, 
Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym of the Federal District Court for the District of Central California 
ordered Apple to provide "reasonable technical assistance" to the F.B.I. in unlocking the phone. 5 
That assistance should have allowed investigators to "bypass or erase the auto-erase function" on 
the phone , among other steps, she wrote." 6 Apple appealed the decision following the ruling. The 
case died during that appeals process when the FBI found a third party that was willing and able 
to break the encryption. 
This case is key : it is the penultimate example of the clash that is occuning between the 
intelligence community and the private sector over national security. It is about technology that 
does not exist. More than that, it is about teclmology that the intelligence community does not 
have and or is unable to get - technology that , according to the intelligence community, is vital 
to national security. This case also brought this issue to the attention of the public. Legal expe11s 
and tech experts alike from Yahoo Finance, Fortune , and FBI Director James Corney touted this 
as the test case for big tech and government that would ultimately land on the steps of the 
Supreme Colll1 and define the precedent for the coming decades. As Fortune put it in 2016 , "It's 
4Roberts, Jeff Jo hn . "App le vs. the FBI: An Explanati on of the Legal Issues ." Does the FBI Have a Strong Legal 
Case Again st Apple? Here' s an Analy sis I Fortune.com. February 20 , 2016. Accessed May 02 , 2017. 
http://fortune.com/2016 /02/ 18/ fbi-iphone/. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Benner, Eric Lichtb lau and Katie. "App le Fight s Order to Unlock Sa n Bernardino Gunman's iPhone ." The New 
York Times . February 17, 2016. Acce ssed May 02 , 2017. https://www.nyt imes.com /2016/02/18 /technology /apple-
timothy-cook-fb i-san-bernardino.hlml ?_r=O. 
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the biggest tech case of the year, and maybe the decade . .. The outcome will ripple across the 
entire technology sector and influence governments around the world." 7 Director Corney , in his 
testimony before a congressional intelligence panel, agreed that the ultimate outcome of the 
Apple-FBI showdown is likely to "guide how other courts handl e similar requests. "8 
Whether this is true or not , no one can be certain, but what is certain is that this problem 
is not going to go away. Technology is going to continue to advance, national security is going to 
continue to be threatened , and the intelligence community will likely continue to fall behind the 
curve when it comes to the development of technology that aids in the protection of national 
security. As a result , the private sector and public sector need to be ready to address whatever 
comes in the future. This will require the achievement of a number of things : (1) it will require 
understanding the current internal and external environment of both the intelligence community 
and the private sector; (2) understanding the issues that are pre venting cooperation between the 
two groups (in essence understanding why the private sector won't turn over the technology 
being requested and why the intelligence community is unable to create the technology 
themselves); (3) acquiring and in depth knowledge of the legal arguments and national security 
implications; and (4) understanding the impacts that comi decisions like the one discussed in the 
introduction will have on the private sector in the future. 
So, while it might not be possible to decipher the future , it is possible to look at the 
players, the issues, the legal arguments, and outline potential scenario s for the future and, in 
7 Roberts, Jeff John. "Apple vs . the FBI: An Explanation of the Legal Issues." Does the FBI Hav e a Strong Lega l 
Case Against Apple? Here's an Ana lys is I Fortune. com. February 20 , 2016 . Acce ssed May 02, 2017 . 
http ://fortun e.com/2016/02 / 18/fb i-iphone / . 
8 Ackerman , Spencer, and Sam Thielman . "FB I director admits Apple encryption case could set lega l precedent." 
Th e Guardia n. Febru ary 25 , 2016. Accessed May 05, 2017. 
http s://www .theguardian.com / technolo gy/20 I 6/feb/25/fbi-di rector-jame s-come y-appl e-encrypt ion-case- 1 egal-
precedent. 
5 
doing so, begin to truly understand and answer the question of who is ultimately responsible for 
helpin g protect national secur ity. 
PART ONE: WHO IS INVOLVED? 
6 
In examining the question of who is responsible for protecting national security there are 
three main entities involved . The first entity is the courts, who are acting as referee between the 
two parties. The second entity is the private sector; a preci se definition will be outlined in the 
preceding sections . The third and final entity is the intelligence community. 
All three of these groups have an interest in protecting national security. For the courts 
and the intelligence community it is part of their responsibility and mission to help protect 
national security. But what about the private sector? The interest of the private sector protecting 
national security comes from the markets. "Marke ts provide a variety of incentives to producers, 
their customers, and local communities to guard against a wide range of risks, including the 
possibility of terrori sm." 9 However, in the age of globalization the means and extent to which 
private companies want to guard against acts of terror and help protect national security is 
changing. While companies understand that terrorism has the potentiality to completely destroy a 
given business by means of private and social costs, they also understand that there are other 
outside costs with helping protect national security. In other words all three entitie s want to 
protect national security, they all just have different ways and means by which they believe they 
should be able to do so. This section will look at the details of the private sector and the 
intelligence community. It will examine the current state of both groups and how the current 
state of these groups plays into the ability of each to protect national security. 
A) The Private Sector 
For the purpos es of this paper, the private sector is a term used to describe non-governmental 
actors that are engaged in a variety of different sectors of business in the United States and 
internationally. The private sector can also be referred to as private industry. Some of the key 
9 Farmer, Richard D. "Homeland Securit y and the Private Sector." A CBO Pap er. December 2004. Acces sed May 4, 
2017. hltp: //www .cbo.gov/s ites/default/file s/cbofile s/ftpdocs /60xx/cloc6042/ 12-20 -home land sec urity .pdf. 
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companies within this sector come from the sub-sector of information technol ogy ( or tech) 
sector. This sector, as well as several others, are responsible for the production of a variety of 
technologies that can be used or are relevant to the intelligenc e community 's mission to prote ct 
national securit y. 
The information technology sector is comprised of eight different industries. Those 
industries include: (1) communications equipment ; (2) electronic equipm ent, (3) instruments and 
components; (4) internet software and services; (5) IT services, (6) semi-condu ctors and 
semiconductor equipment; (7) software ; and lastly, (8) technology hardware, storage and 
periph erals. 10 Major companies in this sector include Apple, Samsung Electronic s, Foxconn , 
Amazon.com , Alphabet Inc. (parent company of google) , Dell Technologies , and LG. Some of 
these companies are based internationally and some are based domestically. However they all are 
global corporations with research and development facilities in the United States or technolo gies 
that are overwhelmingly used within the United States. As PwC indicates on its website Strategy 
&, "The tech industry is always in flux. Frequent new products and category innovation define 
and redefine the sector 's constantly shifting landscape. But lately [it has seen] seen even greater 
volatility than usual, and it has begun to affect the makeup of hardwar e and software companies 
themselves" .11 With such fierce competition , companies are in constant battle for the next big 
thing. Once they find it they are then in a race against the clock to protect it. In an article written 
for the Harvard Business Review , "The New Logic of High-Tech R&D", Gary Pisano and 
Steven C. Wheelwright have shown that: 
10 
"Informat ion Techno logy Secto r - Find Invest ment s." Find Investme nts in the Informa tion Technol ogy Sector -
Fide lity. Accessed May 02 , 20 17. 
https://e resea rch .Fide lity .com/eresearch/markets_ sec tors /secto rs/s ector s_ i n_market j htm I ?tab=i n vestment s§or=45. 
11 Casey, Henning Hagen Thomas . "2015 Techn ology Indu stry Trends." Stra tegy& - the glo bal strategy cons ultin g 
team at PwC. January 22 , 20 15. Accessed May 02 , 2017. https: //www. strategyand.pwc .com/tre nds/20 15-
technology-tre ncls. 
8 
Innovative proce ss technologies are an underexploited way for organizations to 
protect and extend the proprietary position of their products . Great new products 
are two-edged swords. They create new market s, attract buyers willing to pay 
premium prices, and enable a company to generate significant profits. The better 
and more successful the product, however, the more competitors strive to imitate 
it. And imitators can be swift and ruthless. Companies have traditionally fended 
off imitators with patents, but patents rarely provide complete protection. 12 
In other words, the sector is extremely competitive and volatile , making the limited protections 
that patent s and copyrights give to proprietary material extremely valuable. As such it becomes 
problematic when intelligence agencies then request proprietaiy technology which then could be 
released, leaked, or used in a way that diminishes its value to customers within the sector. 
Companies have little incentive to cooperate with public authorities since maintaining their 
value , market share, and customer base is a priority. A company wanting to protect its assets is 
fine on its own merits. Every company within the sector has an obligation to its shareholders to 
keep the compai1y profitable , but what happens when the intelligence community needs that 
information to protect national security? A key problem is this inherent conflict between 
company survival and national security. 
B) The Intelligence Community 
The intelligence community (IC) is comprised of seventeen different organizations directed 
by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). 13 The intelligence community operates on a 
disclosed budget of approximately 70 billion dollars each year. Other estimates add an additional 
billion dollar s in funds for classified line items that cannot be disclosed. In 2010," the 
Washington Post did a two-year investigation of the cunent state of the intelligence community. 
Durin g that inve stigation , the Post found "so me 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 
12 Wheelwright , Gary P. PisanoSteven C. "The New Logic of High-Tech R&D." Harva rd Business Review. July 3 1, 
2014. Acce ssed May 02 , 20 I 7. http s:// hbr.or g/1995/09/ the-new-logic- of-high -tech-rd. 
13 
"ODNI Home. " Ho me. Accessed May 03, 2017. https://www.dn i.gov/ index .php/what -we-do/ ic-budge t. 
9 
private companies work on programs related to counterte1rnrism, homeland security and 
intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States. An estimated 854,000 people, 
nearly 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington, D.C. , hold top-secret security 
clearance s." 14 That number has only grown since 2010. 
The rapid growth and expansion of the intelligence community can be directly linked to the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. 
The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency , for example, has gone from 7,500 
employees in 2002 to 16,500 today. The budget of the National Security Agency, 
which conducts electronic eavesdropping , doubled. Thirty-five FBI Joint 
Te1rnrism Task Forces became 106. With the quick infusion of money , military 
and intelligence agencies multiplied ... In all at least 263 organizations have been 
created or reorganized as a respon se to 9/11. 15 
The rapid expansion of the IC also included the rapid expansion of the bureaucracy that must 
surround all parts of the federal government. This expansion was deemed necessary for the 
protection of national security. U nfo1tunately , there is little data to prove whether or not the rapid 
expansion of the IC has led to a safer America. The intelligence community cannot broadcast its 
succe sses, but everyone knows about its failures. With the rapid growth of personnel within the 
intelligence space, one would think that the IC would not need the help of the private sector. The 
problem is that more people does not neces sarily mean more solutions. In a globalized and 
increasingly interdependent world , even with 854,000 people, the IC still needs to consult 
outside resources. 
C) Moving Forward 
14 Priest , Dan a, and William Arkin. "A Hidden World Growing Out of Co ntrol. " The Washington Post . 2010. 
Acce ssed May 03 , 2017. http ://proje cts.was hington pos t.com/top -secre t-america/ar ticles /a-hiclclen-world -growing -
beyond-control/2. 
15 Ibid. 
10 
So why is it necessary to understand the actors involved? It is necessary to understand the 
private sector and the intelligence community because the make-up of both entities is completel y 
different. They operate differently , have different priorities , and are motivated by different goals 
and incentives. Despite this, both groups benefit from a safe America. Business benefits because 
private business operates at its best in a safe environment. Markets and businesses hate 
uncertainty and risk. As such they have an inherent buy-in at helping protect national security; if 
it helps them ensure a safe operating environment, which could lead to higher profits. 
Given this common interest, one is left to wonder why won 't the intelligence community 
and the private sector play ball? On its face, some would think that there is no reason for the two 
not to cooperate as then President Obama put it, "we' re going to need the tech community, the 
software designers , the people who care deeply about this stuff to help us solve it. Because what 
you'll find ... is that after something really bad happens , the politics of this will swing, and they 
will become sloppy, and rushed , and it will go through Congress in ways that have not been 
thought through.". 16 Others argue that the only reason that the private sector won't help is 
because of concern for loss of profits. People opposing Apple 's stance are saying that Apple may 
well lose some business over this. At the time of the incident President Trump called for a 
boycott until Apple agreed to help the FBI; subsequently many paity faithful are claiming that 
the company is "building phones for te1rnrists." 17 Still others would argue that the intelligence 
community is seeking the technology of the private sector solely because they want the 
proprietary technology to keep tabs on the lives of ordinary Americans . This case in particular 
has the potential for massive government intrusion in the lives of everyday Americans and in the 
16 Elmer -DeW itt, Phil ip. "What Obama Sa id About Apple vs . FBI at SXSW." I Fortune.co m. March 14, 2016 . 
Accessed May 05 , 20 I 7. http: //fortune.com /2016/03/ I 2/obama-sxsw-apple -vs-fbi/ . 
17 CNBC. "Trum p calls for Apple boyco tt. .. while using iPhone. " CNBC. February 19, 2016 . Acce ssed May 05, 
2017. http://www.cn bc.com/2 0 l6/02/ l 9/trump -ca lls-for-ap ple-boycott. htm l. 
11 
private sector. As Apple said in one of its briefings , "If the government can invoke the All Writs 
Act to compel Apple to create a spec ial operating system that undermines important security 
measures on the iPhone, it could argue in future cases that the courts should compel Apple to 
create a version to track the location of suspects , or secretly use the iPhone's microphone and 
camera to record sound and video." 18 Additionally , Apple proffers that "Once the process is 
created , it provides an avenue for criminal s and foreign agents to access millions of iPhones. 
And once developed for our government , it is only a matter of time before foreign governments 
demand the same tool." 19 
This particular tension that exists between the intelligence community and the private 
sector once again brings up the age-old debate between security and liberty. Those erring on the 
side of liberty are more likely to side with Apple and the private sector fighting against the 
oveneach of govenm1ent. While others will side with the intelli gence community who have 
decided that capitalism and the decentralization of information and authority are no longer in the 
interest of protecting national secur ity. 
The reality is that simplicity of those arguments do not take into account the full context 
of the issue. The question of who should be responsible for helping protecting national security 
does not come down to profit and loss, it doe s not come down to who has the most resources , 
rather it comes down to a series of factors and issues that are putting both entities at odds against 
one another. 
PART TWO: ENEMIES UNKNOWN 
18 Domono ske , Cam ila, and Alina Selyukh. "App le Vs. The Government , In Their Own Word s." NPR. March lO, 
20 I 6. Accessed Ma y 05 , 20 17 . http: //www. npr.org/sec tion s/thetwo-way/2016/03/10/469994735/app le-vs-the-
gove rnmen t-i n-thei r-own-wo rds. 
19 Ib id. 
12 
In addressing the question of who is responsible for helping protect national security it is 
not uncommon to try and figure out who the good guy is and who the bad guy is. In this case the 
bad guys are not the private sector nor the intelligence community , it is the people that are 
putting the two at odds against one another. It is the common enemy of both entities , it is the 
enemies of the United States who seek to cause terror and bring misfortune and pain to the 
citizens of this country. It is impossible for the United States intelligence community to process 
every piece of data, every report , and every intelligence communication. There is just too much 
information . 
Due to the inability of the IC to provide 100 percent protection and security; it is not 
surprising that acts of terror occur every day , all across the globe, It is the reality of the world as 
it exists today. In the case of San Bernardino, the terror committed in that office space was 
committed by two people with guns. The technology at issue in that case was not the guns but 
the phone that was in the pocket of one of the shooters. The attack was not technologically 
complex, but the phone was and it prevented the FBI from getting info1mation that it needed in 
the case that was vital to national security . Technology that may be mundane in its day to day 
existence can now become the key to unlocking the next big clue. 
This time it was guns , the next time there is an attack on the United States it might be an act 
of cyberwarfare. In a statement to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs , Robe11 Anderson , Jr. (the acting Executive Assistant Director , Criminal, 
Cyber, Response , and Services Branch , of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation) stated that , "We 
face cyber threats from state-sponsored hacker s, hackers for hire, global cyber syndicates , and 
terrorists. They seek our state secrets, our trade secrets, our technology , and our ideas- things of 
incredible value to all of us. They seek to strike our critical infrastructure and to harm our 
13 
economy. Given the scope of the cy ber threat , agencies across the federal government are 
making cyber security a top priority " .20 Enemies of the United States do not telegraph their next 
rn:oves; they do not send us warning s about the means by which they intend to perpetrate their 
next attack . The enemy now has options, and becaus e of this the intelligence community has no 
way of guaranteeing that the technology that they currently possess is going to be the most 
relevant or the most adequate in the protection of national security . Moreover, because of the 
variety of weapon s available to our enemies the intelligence community is struggling to handle 
every potential threat that comes their way. Whether they know it or not, whether they intend to 
or not , the enemie s of the United States are winning because they are turning natural allies 
against one another. Both the intelligence community and the private sector are trying to respond 
to enemie s unknown and still meet policy goals and profit margins . 
PART THREE: THE COURTS 
20 Sange r , David E. "Chin ese Curb Cyberat tacks on U.S. Interes ts, Repor t Find s." The New York Times. Jun e 20 , 
2016 . Accesse d May 03, 201 7 . htt ps://www .nytime s .co m/2 0 16/06/2 l/u s/po litics/c hina -us-cybe r-spying.html 
14 
In answering the question of who is responsible for protectin g national security the 
answer must ultimately come from the courts , and it is likely that decision will come down from 
the Supreme Court. But the question that the Supreme Cou11 will answer will not be 
' who is respon sible for helping protect national security?" The question that they will answer is: 
does the private sector have to comply with court orders that mandate them to give proprietary 
technology to the government in the interest of national security or in the interest of helping law 
enforcement with criminal prosecution? This section will examine two relevant case studies that 
will help to unpack the legal arguments surrounding the issue. In addition, the section will look 
at amicus briefs that a variety of different groups have submitted. In under standing the legal 
arguments , the question of who is respon sible for helping to protect national security can be 
answered , becaus e until Congress ways in or either side surrenders fully the courts will have the 
final say in the matter 
A) Case Study 1 
There are two pertinent cases that we can look to for guidance in this matter: cite them both 
here . This section will cover the first of those two cases. 
The facts regarding this case (In the matter of the search of an Apple iPhone seized during 
the execution of a Search Warrant on a black Lexus 1S300, California License Plate 35KGD203) 
are explained in the introduction. In brief: a cellphone belonging to one of the attackers in the 
San Bernardino terrori st attack was discovered through the course of the investigation. Upon 
receipt of that cellphone the FBI came to discover that they were unabl e to unlock that device. 
They would need to request the help of Apple, the maker of the phone in question , to unlock the 
phon e in the intere st of national secmity. What mak es this case different is that, as a result of 
newer and more advance encryption , Apple did not have the technolo gy to unlock the phone 
15 
either. When Apple refused to aid the FBI with their request the FBI went to the courts , seeking 
an order that would compel Apple to create the technology needed to unlock the phone. Upon 
receipt of the arguments by both partie s, "U .S. Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym of U.S. District 
Court in Los Angeles ruled that Apple must provide "reasonable technical assistance" to 
investigators seeking to unlock the data on Farook's iPhone SC." 2 1 Apple proceeded to appeal 
that decision . As the appeals process moved forward the FBI was able to find a third-party 
vendor that was actually able to unlock the phone. At this point the case was moot, but it still 
provides a wealth of legal information for this case and other cases that are pending before courts 
across the United States in which the intelligence community (through the federal government) is 
requesting the same level of compliance from Apple and others like them. 
a) Legal Arguments 
In lookin g at some of the broader legal arguments made in the case: prosecutors on behalf of 
U.S. Attorney's office argue that the order should be granted under the "All Writs Act" or A WA. 
In brief the AW A gives the Supreme Court and all courts the power to issue necessary and 
appropriate writs in aid to their jurisdiction. 22 In essence the Act gives comts the blanket 
coverage that is necessary to help agencies perform their given tasks by compelling others to act 
as long as the action required is within the confines of the law. Apple , in contrast, has argued that 
the order should not be granted. They view the order as a violation of the company 's First , 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Both patty's arguments have merits but must be examined 
in further detail to get a clearer picture. 
21 Reuters . "A judge ordered Apple to help the FBI break into Syed Farook's phone." Newsweek. May 22 , 2016. 
Accessed May 04, 2017. hllp://w,, w .ncws\l'cck.cQm/apple-phune-ll1i-s\ ed-rizwan-farook-san-bernarclino-shouting-
clecem ber-is is---1-27--1-3. 
22 Ibid. 
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1. First Amendment Arguments 
As CNN Tech put it, "The [First Amendment] legal argument Apple is expected to use can 
be summed up like this: Code is protected speech, so the government can't compel Apple to write 
a new version of i OS any more than it can force an author to write a story. "23 In other words 
App le does not want to write the story and the government cannot force them to write it. In 
arguing the First Amendment violation , Apple could potentially cite Bernstein v. Department of 
Justice. In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the code in a 
developer's software was protected by the First Amendment " .24 While this case is not a Supreme 
Court case, it is the close st that any court has necessarily come to in terms of a definitive answer 
on the question of code being free speech. 
While the arguments are viable they are by no means full proof. The tech giant would "have 
to overcome years of precedent in the way that companies work with law enforcement "25. Apple 
itself has worked with law enforcement officials in the past. They must prove that this case is 
different and that there is a difference in the code that they were previously willing to provide 
and the code that they are currently being asked to provide. The biggest argument that they can 
make on that score, is that the code that they provided in other cases had already been written 
and was in existence. In this case , the code does not exist and Apple has never before provided 
authorities with newly written code upon request. 
Secondary to the free speech argument is the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act. The Act states that law enforcement lacks the power "to require any specific 
23 To force App le to help the FBI unlock a San Bernardin o shooter's iPhone. "App le's case agai nst the FBI won't be 
easy ." CNN Mon ey . February 25, 2016. Accesse d May 04 , 2017. 
http://money .cnn.com/2016 /02/25/ techno logy/apple-fbi -court-ca se/. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid . 
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design of equipment, facilities , services , features, or system configurations to be adopted by any 
provider of a wire or electronic communication service" .26 The relation ship being that as a result 
of the act not requiring specific "language " in programming , the gove rnment ha s no right to 
require this kind of " language " or code from Appl e. 
ii. Fourth Amendment 
As Grady Lowman writes in an aiiicle for Rutgers Journal for Law and Policy, "Apple 
champion ed its consumers' privacy right s in the media . But the conc ern over consumers ' privac y 
rights that has been so preva lent in the media is myster iously absent where it really matters -in 
court" 27 (To an extent the argument was brought in Court , but it mainly play ed out in the eyes of 
the media and was acknow ledged in several decisions). In asserting jus tertii doctrine Apple 
would be allowed to "asse rt the cons titutional right s of their consumers, eve n thou gh the 
consumers aren't paii of th e lawsuit"28 In 2014 the Supreme Court recognized a "constitutional 
privacy intere st in cell phon e data", this prot ection went beyon d the initial grant of the wairn nt 
because of the ability of the government to obtain more information than the warrant would 
authorize. As Lowman put s it , "The concern is that , if the FBI success fully forces Apple to 
create a backdoor , the government will use this as precedent for caiie blanche access to locked 
phon es in the future , creating Fourth Amendment issues not only in the way the phone is 
accessed, but the potential for over-seizing data ", thu s uprooting the constitutional privacy 
interes t in cellphone data. 
2626 Hackett, Robert. "T oward Resolving Apple' s FBI Dispu te." Fortune - For tun e 500 Daily & Breaking Business 
News. Febru ary 26, 2016. Accessed May 04 , 2017. http ://l"qrlune .com/20 16/02/27/apple-fbi-supre rne-cou rt-
resol l'e/> . 
27 Lowman , Grady. "App le vs . FB I: The Fo rgo tten Fourth Ame ndm ent Argument." Rutgers Journal of Law and 
Public Policy . Rut gers University Schoo l of Law, March 21 , 2016. Acce ssed December 7 , 20 I 6 . 
28 Ibid. 
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The opposing argument to this being that the FBI is asking for extremely narrowly tailored 
access to the code for this one specific phone. So the threat of carte blanche Fomih Amendment 
violations does not exist. Prosecutors would further argue that they aren 't trying to tell Apple 
exactly how to build the software so there is nothing stopping Apple from writing protocol s into 
the code that would only give law enforcement access to this singular phone. The problem 
complicating that argument, is that Apple is saying that the software that would allow for single 
acces s does not exist , and there is no way to know if the software can be built to only unlock one 
phone. The argument s in the case regarding the Fourth Amendment would be left to unknown 
circumstances and arguments of what if. 
But it is imp01iant to note , that in this case the potentiality for Fourth Amendment violations 
did not stop the judge from compelling Apple to assist in the case. The judge was convinced that 
the program could be narrowly tailored enough not to infringe on the Fomih Amendment right s 
of Apples customers. 
iii. Fifth Amendment 
In regards to the Fifth Amendment , Apple ' s attorneys argue , "By conscripting a private pmiy 
with an extraordinarily attenuated connection to the crime to do the government' s bidding in a 
way that is statutorily tmauthorized , highly burdensome, and contrary to the party's core 
principles , [the govenunent's request] violate s Apple's substantive due process right to be free 
from the "arbitra1y deprivation of [its] libe1iies" . 29 In other words, Apple is saying that they 
have no direct connection to the San Bernardino shooting, and as a private entity there are no 
laws that outline the comi ' s ability to compel or conscript them into action. 
29 Sterbenz, Christina. "Apple Is Using 2 Main Arguments in Its Epic Fight against the FBI." Business Insider. 
Business Insider, February 26, 2016. Accessed December 7, 20 I 6. 
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The counter to this argument that could be made by prosecutors is a nod to tradition. As 
Justice Department spokesperson Melanie Newman said in a statement, it doesn't matter that 
Apple and the shooting are not substantially related; there is no due process violation as, "Law 
enforcement has a longstanding practice of asking a court to require the assistance of a third 
party in effectuating a search warrant ... When such requests concern a technological device, we 
narrowly target our request to apply to the individual device. In each case, a judge must review 
the relevant information and agree that a third paiiy 's assistance is both necessary and reasonable 
to ensure law enforcement can conduct a court-authorized search". 30 
iv. All Writs Act 
The All Writs Act of 1789 is the central argument of the federal government in cases like this 
one. The All Writs Act was established "to ensure courts in colonial America had the same 
traditional powers as those in England ". 31 It is the opinion of some that the "The feds just want 
the court , like courts have on many other occasions, to use its power under the Act to get Apple 
to comply with the search warrant ". 32 
This is case is not the first in which the government says that the All Writs Act gives "broad 
latitude to judges to request "third parties " to execute court orders". 33 There are currently nine 
open cases involving Apple and other teclmology companies that involve the AW A compelling 
the companies to act on behalf of the government to provide a variety of information or 
intelligence from their products. 
30 Ibi d. 
31 Benner , Eric Lichtblau and Katie. "Appl e Fight s Order to Unlock San Bernardin o Gunman' s iPhone." The New 
York Times. February 17, 2016. Accessed May 02 , 2017. https: //www .nytimes.com/2016/02/ 18/technolog y/apple-
ti moth y-cook-fbi-san-bernard i no .htm I? _r=0. 
32 Robert s, Jeff John. "The U.S. vs. Apple: Does the FBI Have a Case?" Fortun e. February 19, 20 16. Acce sse d 
December 7, 2016. <http://fort une.com/2016/02/ 18/fbi- iphonel>. 
33 Benne r , Eric Lichtblau and Katie. "Apple Fight s Order to Un lock San Bernardin o Gunman's iPhone." The New 
York Times. Februar y 17, 2016. Acc esse d May 02, 20 17 . http s://www .nyt imes .com/20 16/02/18 /tec hnology/a pple -
timothy-cook-fbi -san-bernardi no .html ?_ r=0. 
20 
In contrast to the broad latitude argument, Apple argues that the act has "strict limits" which 
are supp01ied by precedent. Precedent concerning it will be discus sed a little bit later. But the 
second part of Apple's argument is that Apple believes that the court won't order the company to 
act "if it concludes the company is "so far removed from the underlying controversy" or if would 
place an "unreasonable burden " on Apple". 34 Apple argues that the company is far removed 
from the underlying crime because they had nothing to do with the shooting and there is no 
definitive proof there is evidence of the crime on the phone , there is only speculation. 
Furthermore, the phones service provider has been able to provide phone logs and texts , but there 
has been no evidence that the phone itself offers any additional proof of the crime. Apple also 
has grounds to argue that the order would present an unreasonable burden to the company. This 
unreasonable burden comes as the result of two different factors. The first factor would be the 
burden of Apple having to come up with the code and software to unlock the phone. As has been 
stated the code does not exist so Apple would have to devote the time, the money , and the 
energies to create the code , creating an undue burden . The second factor is the burden that the 
order will place on Apple 's revenue. The company has marketed for years on its ability to 
provide privacy to its customers. If Apple is compelled to comply and the program is out there it 
can no longer guarantee this privacy to its customers. This could cost Apple customers and 
market share, place an undue burden on Apple and its shareholders. The judgement of the 
legality of the order under the All Writs Act will mainly be determined by the latitude that the 
court gives to its interpretation . 
In terms of precedent regarding the All Writs Act argument the courts has gone both ways. 
The government cited a 1977 ruling requirin g phone companies to help set up a pen register, a 
34 Ibid . 
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device that records all numbers called from a particular phone line.35 This was a case where the 
company was compelled to assist the government under the act and the court sustained the order 
under a broad interpretation. In another case, cited by Apple this time, in 2005, a federal 
magistrate judge rejected the argument that the law could be used to compel a 
telecommunications provider to allow real-time tracking of a cellphone without a search 
warrant ".36 So, when it comes to the All Writs Act there is no clear precedent for the courts to 
follow . 
b) Conclusions 
Had this case gone through the appeals process there is little doubt that it would have gone 
all the way up to be the Supreme Comi. Prior to settling out of court this case was slated to set 
precedent for the intelligence community and the private sector for the next decade. While there 
is no guarantee what the exact arguments of the pmiies would have been or what the result of the 
case would have been it would have provided a strong precedent. 
B) Case Study 2 
a. Legal Arguments 
The second case occurred in the United States District Court, Eastern District of New in 
February of 2016. In this incidence , a suspect by the name of Jm1 Feng had been arrested and 
brought before the comi on drug charges. During the course of the investigation Feng 's iPhone 5 
was lawfully obtained by the police. The phone was not of immediate value to law enforcement. 
But as the case proceeded law enforcement believed that they needed to be granted access to the 
phon e. Unforttmately, law enforcement was not able to gain access to the information on the 
35 Benner , Eric Lichtblau and Ka tie. "App le Figh ts Order to Unlock San Bernardino Gunman's iPhone." The New 
York Times . February 17, 2016. Accessed May 02, 20 17 . http s://www.nytimes .com/20 l6 /02/l8 /technology /apple-
ti rnoth y- cook -fbi -san-bernard i no .html ? _r=0. 
36 lbid. 
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phone due to the phones password protection and safety measures . Following an unsuccessful 
consultation with the FBI, law enforcement in New York requested the assistance of Apple. As 
such the State sought an order requiring Apple , to bypass the passcode security. 37 It was asserted 
that such an order would assist in the execution of a search warrant previously issued by the 
court , and that the All Writs Act , 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (the "AWA"), empowered the court to 
grant such relief. 38 (The All Writs Act was also used in the main argument of the state regarding 
the San Bernardino shooting which will be discussed at length in the following sections.) Apple 
in opposition argued that the state did not meet the minimum requirements outlined within the 
act, and could not prove the factors necessary for the court to order compliance under the AW A. 
What is interesting about this particular case, and something that is impmiant to the its judgment , 
is that while the proceedings were occmTing between Apple and the government to let them 
unlock the iPhone the suspect in the case plead guilty to charges. But rather than the order 
becoming a moot issue, government still sought the order requiring Apple to unlock the device. 
The reason that they still wanted the phone was for the purposes of sentencing and for use in the 
trials of Mr. Feng ' s co-conspirators in the case. With that being said, in February of2016 U.S. 
Magistrate Judge James Orenstein ruled against the govenunent denying the motion. 
In evaluating the ruling there are several key features that stick out; and are important to 
the ultimate question of should govenm1ent be allowed to compel private companies in assisting 
with matters of national security. While this was not a matter of national security , it is indicative 
of some of the same arguments. In this motion , the judge "applied previous legal decisions 
interpreting th e AW A and concluded that the law does not 'j ustif[y] imposing on Apple the 
37 IN RE ORDER REQUIRING APPLE , INC. TO ASSI ST IN THE EXECUTION OF A SEARC H WARRANT 
ISSUED BY THIS COUR T. (UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTE RN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
February 29, 2016). 
38 Ibid. 
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obligation to assist the government ' s investigation against its will." In a formulation extremely 
favorable to Apple, the judge wrote that the key question raised by the government' s request is 
whether the AW A allows a court "to compel Apple - a private party with no alleged 
involvement in Feng's criminal activity - to perform work for the government against its 
will."39 It was the belief of this judge that the law does not permit the concluding result- "both 
becau se relevant law contains limit s on what companies like Apple are required to do, and 
becau se Congress never enacted any such obligations." 40 
Now had Congress enacted such obligations this would be a completel y different story. 
But the point of the matter is that the government did not show enough evidence in support of 
their application under the All Writs Act. For an A WA application to be successful it must 
establish the following factors: 
1. the closene ss of the relationship between the per son or entity to whom the 
propo sed writ is directed and the matter over which the court has juri sdiction; 
2. the reasonablenes s of the burden to be imposed on the writ's subject; and 
3. the necessity of the requ ested writ to aid the court's jurisdiction (which does replicat e the 
second statutor y element , despite the overlapping language). 
See N. Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174-78. 
In reviewing this motion , the judge held that "Apple had no involvement in Feng ' s crime, and 
it has taken no affirmative action to thwart the government's investigation of that crime. 4 1 In 
addition, "App le lawfully sold to Feng, as it sells to millions of law-abiding individuals and 
39 Greenwald, Glen , and Jenna McLaughl in . "Apple Win s Major Cour t Victory Against FB I in a Case Simi lar to San 
Bernard ino. " The Intercept . February 29 , 2016. Acce ssed May 04 , 2017 . http s://theintercept.com /2016/02/29/app le-
wi ns-major -court -v ictory - i n-i ts-battl e-agai nst-fbi -i n-a-case -si mi lar-to -san-bernardi no/ . 
40 Ibid. 
41 In Re Order Req uirin g Apple , Inc. To Ass ist In Th e Execution Of A Searc h Warrant Issued By T his Court. 
(United State s District Court Eastern District Of New York Febru ary 29, 2016). 
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entities (including the government itself), a product that can effectively secure its stored data 
for the protection of its owner ," and "Feng used that device for criminal purpose s and left it 
locked ".42 The ruling also emphasized that: 
"Apple is not 'thwar ting ' anything - it is instead merely declining to offer 
assistance." While a party may - or may not - have a moral duty to assist the 
government in criminal investigations , "not hing in [prior case law] suggests that 
the 'duty ' ... is lega l rather than moral." Particularly since Congress has 
explicitly authorized companies to produce telecommunications devices with 
security mea sures, there is no basis to conclude that Apple has done anything 
wrong by enabling its customers to lock their devices. "43 
The lack of relationship between Apple and Feng was recognized by the judge and as such was 
a strike against the criteria for an AW A ruling. 
Second , when it comes to the matter of ' reasonablenes s of the burden ' imposed on the 
subject , " the rulin g recognized that forcing Apple to compromise its own secmity systems at 
the behest of the U.S. governme nt would impose a considerab le cost far beyond financial 
expense ".44 Third , the nece ssity of the writ was called into que stion as a result of Feng already 
having plead guilty. 
The arguments that the government made in this motion are extremely simi lar to other 
cases that have come before the court in recent months regarding similar reque sts of 
compliance from Apple. And the judg e took notice of this fact. In his ruling Judge Orenstein 
wrote the following: 
4
~ Ibid. 
"The Application before this court is by no means singular: the government has 
to date succes sfully invoked the A WA to secure Apple 's compelled assistance 
43 Greenwald, Glen , and Jenna McLaughlin. "Apple Wins Major Court Victory Agains t FBI in a Case Similar to San 
Bernardino." The Intercept. February 29 , 20 I 6. Accessed May 04 , 2017. hllps://theinlercept.com/2016/02/29/applc-
" i 11s-11rn jor-coun -v ictory-i 11-i 1s-ba11lc-ag_ai nst-fbi-i 1H1-case-si mi lar-lo-san-bernarcli no/ . 
About: 
In Re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. To Assist In The Execut ion Of A Search Warran t Issued By This Court. (United 
States District Cou rt Eastern District Of New York February 29 , 2016) . 
44 [bid. 
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in bypassing the passcode security of Apple devices at least 70 times in the past; 
it has pending litigation in a dozen more cases in which Apple has not yet been 
forced to provide such assistance; and in its most recent use of the statute it goes 
so far as to contend that a court - without any legislative authority other than 
the AW A - can require Apple to create a brand new product that impairs the 
utility of the products it is i11 the business of selling. 
It is thus clear that the government is relying on the AW A as a source of 
authority that is legislative in every meaningful way: something that can be 
cited as a basis for getting the relief it seeks in case after case without any need 
for adjudication of the particular circumstances of an individual case (as the 
arguments that the government relies on here to justify entering an A WA order 
against Apple would apply with equal force to any instance in which it cannot 
bypass the passcode security of an Apple device it has a warrant to search)." 45 
Even more disturbing to the judge was the government's claim that because Apple is a U.S. 
company and receives benefits from the United States it has duty or a moral obligation to assist 
the U.S Government and the intelligence community. On this score that judge states: 
"Such argument reflects poorly on a government that exists in part to safeguard 
the freedom of its citizens - acting as individuals or through the organizations 
they create - to make autonomous choices about how best to balance societal 
and private interests in going about their lives and their businesses. The same 
argument could be used to condemn with equal force any citizen's chosen form 
of dissent. All American citizens and companies "derive significant legal, 
infrastructural, and political benefits from [their] status [ as such]" - but that 
cannot mean that they are not burdened in a legally cognizable way when forced 
unwillingly to comply with what they sincerely believe to be an unlawful 
· · ,, 46 government mtrus10n. 
C) Conclusions 
What he writes in his ruling truly embodies the overall since of what is happening in cases like 
this across the country. Government is using the AW A as means by which they can legislate 
from the courts. If they were to succeed , they would be forcing Apple and companies across 
the private sector to help protect national security through court ordered compliance. The 
45 In Re Ord er Requiring Appl e, Inc. To Assist In Th e Executi on Of A Sear ch Warrant Iss ued By This Court. 
(United States District Court Ea stern District Of New York Februar y 29, 2016 ). 
46 Ibid. 
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essential ethical point that the judge is making here is that mandated government intrusion into 
the private sector goes against the foundations of freedom that the country is founded upon . 
Furthermore, Apple choosing not to cooperate is not and should not be viewed as an effort of 
the comp any to support crime or terrorism. Apple did what they believed was right and acted 
within the bounds of the law in an effort to do maintain the protection of their customers 
privac y as well. 
C) Amicus Briefs 
While the legal arguments made by both parties in the two case studies that have been 
outlined and discussed are of the utmo st importance - in our case - the arguments of the two 
partie s are not the only ones of relevance to us. In other words, the voices that are not directl y 
related to this question can be incredibl y insightful. The sheer number of groups that came out in 
support of Apple are tellin g. In total seventeen different bodies wrote amicus briefs in support of 
Apple and four additional individuals wrote letters to the courts . Some of these briefs were solely 
for the use of the San Bernardino case and some were used in both of the case studies outlined 
above. Some of the briefs come from groups such as: The ACLU, Amazon, AT&T the Center for 
Democracy and Technology, The Media Institute , and Privacy International and Human Rights 
Watch. All of these different groups in one voice stood up to say that they supported Apple and 
that they believed in some way that private industry is not responsible for national security. 
Moreover, they believe that the government is misunderstanding the original intent of the All 
Writs Act and that implementation of such a precedent would be bad for the economy, bad for 
the economy, and ultimatel y bad for the goverm11ent. 
For example, the ACLU argues that the governmen ts interpretation of the All Writs Act 
is at its best wrong, and at its worst a make shift power grab for the government to compel third 
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party compliance in the interest of national security. In a blog outlining their amicus brief the 
ACLU writes: 
"That law gives courts the authority to issue orders necessary for it to fulfill its 
judicial role and enforce its decisions. It does not, however, permit courts to give 
law enforcement new investigative tools that Congress has not authorized. In this 
case, the act can't be used by law enforcement to give itself the unprecedented 
power to conscript an innocent third party into government service against its 
will. The use ofthis law is made all the more sweeping considering the vast 
cybersecurity and privacy implications of what the government wants to be able 
to do." 47 
The concerns that ACLU brings to the table are ones of government overreach. The brief goes 
onto argue that if the order in the San Bernardino case were to go into effect there is no way to 
roll that decision back. If the order moves forward , then Pandora's box opens and there is no 
limit to what the government can force the private sector to do. 
In its brief Privacy International and Human Rights Watch argues that: 
"Security features - including encryption and other measures - are integral 
to the protection of civil and human rights. Countries may seek to compel 
technology companies to impair security for illegitimate purposes , including to 
stifle expression, crush dissent, and facilitate arbitrary arrest and torture. In these 
societies, secure technologie s protect all members of society but especially 
vulnerable ones - such as journalists , human rights defenders , and political 
activists - by giving them a safe space to communicate, research , and organize . 
47 Sweren-Becke r , Eliza. "Why We're Defendin g Apple." Ameri can Civil Liberties Union. March 03 , 2016. 
Accessed May 04, 20 l 7 . https://www .aclu.o rg/blog /speak -free ly/w hy-were-defending-app le. 
28 
The U.S. , by compelling technology companies to roll back these protections , 
risks exposing the millions of individuals who reside and work in these places to 
abuse by their governments. " 
If private firms are responsible for protecting national security , how are they going to be 
adequately able to protect their customers? The question would then become can private industry 
serve two masters: national security and their bottom line This brief puts the implicat ions of this 
case into a more globalized perspective. The world is watching. There is no way of knowing 
what will play on the world stage if the needs of the intelligence community are allowed to 
dictate what private fitms have to do with their technology here in the United States. What will 
other more hostile countries force their private sectors to do? The question that needs to be asked 
is if the country is ready to set that kind of precedent not only for ourselves but for the world. 
The last brief that should be noted here is an amicus brief filed jointly between Microsoft, 
Amazon.com, Box , Cisco, Dropbox, Evemote, Facebook , Google , Mozilla, Nest Labs, Pinterest , 
Slack , Snapchat , WhatsApp and Yahoo. These companies , which are normally fierce competitors 
within the marketplace, came together in unity , reflecting their deep , "shared concerns about the 
potential ramifications of this case for technology and for our customers. At stake are 
fundamental questions about privacy, safety , and the rule of law." 48The amicus brief that was 
filed also called into question the veracity of the All Writs Act argument. In part the brief argues 
that , 
"The com1 order in supp011 of the FBI request cites the All Writs Act, which was 
enacted in 1789, and last significantly amended in 1911. We believe the issues 
48 Smith - President and Chief Legal Officer, Brad. "Our legal brief in support of Apple. " Microsoft on the Issues . 
March 03, 2016. A ccessed May 05 , 2017 . http s://blogs.micro soft.com /o n-the-issu es/2016 /03/03/our-le ga l-brief-in-
su pport-of-appl e/tfsm .00000 zp5 rkLq2tdv uyjoyc bidoxcl. 
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raised by the Apple case are too important to rely on a naITow statute from a 
different technological era to fill the Government's perceived gap in cuITent law. 
Instead we should look to Congress to strike the balance needed for 21st century 
technology. "49 
This is not the only brief that brings up whether or not the courts should be the ultimate deciding 
factor in this case. This brief (and others) have questioned the ripeness of this issue for the 
judicial branch when it has yet to be addressed by the legislative branch of the government. 
Many believe that this issue should be legislated on before it comes into the hands of the courts. 
These are ju st a few examples of arguments brought up in the amicus briefs submitted on 
Apple's behalf , but all of them hit on some of the same themes. The government cannot use the 
All Writs Act to mandate that the private sector be held responsible for the protection of 
international security. 
D) Conclusion: 
Something to remember: while some of the cases discussed in this text are not directly 
related to national security they pose the same legal arguments and questions that cases involving 
national security due. In addition , any decision rendered on cases relating to or not relating to 
national security within this same fact pattern have helped to provide a framework for the 
question that is being addressed in this text. 
49 Ibid. 
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PART FOUR: ANSWERING THE QUESTION 
The future of this question might be unknown , but there is an answer to the question right 
now. Based on the research and legal arguments presented at thi s time , it is not the respon sibility 
of the private sector to help protect national security by virtue of providing aid to the intelligence 
community. The cou11s have thus far not compelled the private sector to do so and the privat e 
sec tor has not chosen to do so voluntarily. In cases directly related to national security and in 
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cases with similar fact pattern s the courts have said it is not the respon sibility of the private 
secto r to act, with one exception. In the San Bernardino case Apple was ordered to comply with 
the FBI, but the case was dropped and the order withdrawn. As such no company within the 
private sector has been compelled to help protect national security. Now some would argue that 
it is everyone's job to help protect national security, and to an extent it is. But as of now it is not 
the responsibil ity of the private secto r to either provide proprietary technology or create 
technology that will help the intelligence community protect national security, so to that extent it 
is not the job of the private sector to help protect national security. 
PART FIVE: MOVING FORWARD 
Whil e it is not ctmently the private sectors responsi bility to help protect national security, 
there is no certainty that this will be the case forever , a ruling may come down or a law may be 
passed where it does become the responsibility of the private sector to help protect national 
security. So the best thing that the private sector can do is be prepared for likely legal outcomes, 
and take steps now to prepare for a future that is uncertain. 
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A) Likely Legal Outcomes 
This section addresses the mo st likely legal courses of action that will happen moving 
forward regarding this issue. 
First, there is no way that this issue is going to go away on its own. From September of 
2015 to February of2016 Apple has objected to or otherwise challenged at least twelve 
government requests to help extract data from locked iPhones. There are cun-ently nine cases 
from those twelve that are still pending before the comts at the time of this writing. And those 
are just cases involving Apple. Microsoft has also gone to comt over similar questions regarding 
compliance when it comes to cowt orders. So what happens next? 
At the time of this writing the , neither of the parties involved in Case Study 1 (regarding 
the I phone of the shooter in the San Bernardino Attack) plan to refile or appeal any decision 
reached in the case. As for Case Study 2 (regarding the I phone of a drug trafficker) the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) has made public statements that they plan to appeal the decision of 
Judge Orenstein to deny the motion to compel Apple to unlock the I phone of the suspect in the 
case. At this time, no fwther information could be found regarding a further appeal, however the 
DOJ has said that the case is ongoing. 50 
Prior to the ruling and subsequent dismissal of the San Bernardino case experts were 
saying that , "No matter who wins, an appeal is vi1tually certain. Apple CEO Tim Cook has 
vowed to challenge the government ' s order to the Supreme Court, citing it as a threat to 
consumer privacy and cyber securit y. The Justice Department has also signaled that the issue 
50 Brandom , Russell. "Department of Ju stice appeals rulin g in New York iPhone unlock ing case ." The Verge . March 
07 , 2016. Accessed May 05 , 2017. https ://www .theverge.com /2016/3/7/ 11176566/ap ple-fbi-en cry ption -appea l-new-
york . 
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merits scrutiny by a higher court". 51 Now this never happened as the case was dismissed , but 
had the case not been dismissed and the ruling of Judge Pym compelling Apple to assist the FBI 
been staid on appeal there would be two different courts in two different districts saying to 
different things. You would have the California judge ruling (in essence) that private companies 
are responsible for helping protect national security and you would have a New York judge 
saying that private companies are not responsible for helping police in a crimina l prosecution. 
While this not a technical circuit split , it had the potential to become one. And there is no reason 
to believe that it might not come to that eventually . With nine other cases pending before the 
courts , there is still very much a chance that a circuit spit could occur increasing the likelihood 
that the issue will come before the Supreme Comi. 
If the case comes before the Supreme Comi, there is no telling what will happen. It will 
depend on the make-up of the Court , the case presented before the Court, and the need for 
expediency ( depending on the case brought before the Court). It will depend on the ability of the 
given agency to justify the order that they seek under the All Writs Act. The Supreme Court case 
will come down to the All Writs Act. There are constitutional arguments involved in this case 
but it is the All Writs Act that has been the central argument of prosecutors seeking orders to 
compel the assistance of tech companies. It has also been the All Writs Act that has resulted in 
rulings against agencies seeking the help of the tech industry. The government has not been able 
to make the case stick (with the exception of San Bernardino) when it comes to the All Writs 
Act. If they can do it then they have a fighting chance, but the decisions that have been handed 
down, thus far, in cases discussed in this text as well as others not discussed here, have sided 
with the private sector. 
SI Ibid. 
34 
The Court will rule in one of the following ways: it will either say that it is responsibility 
of the private sector to aid the intelligence community; it is not the responsibility of the private 
sector; or they will say that it should be the issue of Congress and request Congressional action. 
One of these things will happen, but at this time it is not clear which one. 
There is also the chance that Congress could choose to act in the matter and remove the 
decision from the cowis entirely, as some believe Congress should. Judge Orenstein in his ruling 
from Case Study 2 writes , "Congress should decide how much cooperation Apple should be 
forced to give in the encryption case. Using the All Writs Act to force Apple to unlock an 
encrypted phone would transform the law "into a mechanism for upending the separation of 
powers by delegating to the judiciary a legislative power bounded only by Congress's superior 
ability to prohibit or preempt. " 52 While there is no rhetoric coming from Congress that they are 
willing to take up this issue at this time, another high profile incident like San Bernardino might 
force Congress to act rather than wait for a case to make its weigh up to the Supreme Court. 
Looking at the likely legal outcomes the one and only thing that is ce1iain is that this issue 
is not going away anytime soon. 
B) Preparing for the Unknown 
Because the legal outcomes of fmiher cases are unknown, and because the answer to the 
question of who is responsible for helping protect national security may change , it is imp01iant 
for the private sector to try and staii preparing now for what may come. 
a. Things to Consider 
There are some important things that the private sector needs to be considering now before 
52 Ibid. 
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anything changes regarding the relationship between the private sector and the intelligence 
community. First, companies in the private sector , particularly in the tech industry , need to pick 
a side on this issue and they need to do so now. As was stated previously there are as many if 
not more unknown enemies to the United States than there are known. There is no telling where 
the next tenorist attack will come from and there is no telling which company will be impacted 
by that ten-or attack. So in the event that they are impacted, companies need to make a decision 
now as to whether or not they will choose to hand over their technology or create new 
technology in the interest of helping protect national security. Depending on what they choose 
to do they will need to be ready for a fight. Support needs to be garnered from within the 
company now to prepare for any potential backlash that may come no matter what the decision 
of a company is. 
The next thing that the private sector needs to consider is public perception . When Apple 
refused to help the FBI some saw the move as a marketing ploy ; others saw it as a genuine 
concern for their customer ' s privacy rights; and some presidential nominees called for a 
boycott of all Apple products resulting in backlash from members of the republican party. 53 
Despite the array of opinions regarding the Apple's refusal, public perception of the move was 
for the most part positive as people are starting to want more of their own privacy back from the 
federal government. However, companies that choose to refuse to help the intelligence 
community are walking a very fine line when it comes to public perception of the issue. For 
example , what would have happened if the iPhone that belonged to the San Bernardino shooter 
instead belonged to one of the terrorists that orchestrated 9/ 11.There is little doubt that public 
perception of Apple would change dramatically if Apple had refused to aid the FBI under those 
53Diamond , Jeremy. "Donald Trump ca lls for Apple boycott." CNN. Februar y 19, 2016. Acce ssed May 05 , 20 I 7. 
htlp:// www. cnn .com /2016 /02/ l 9/pol itics/donald -trump -appl e- boycot t/i ndex .html . 
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circumstances. Some could view the decision of the private sector as unpatriotic. What is 
important for companies to understand is that they are walking a tight rope when it comes to the 
public' s perception of this issue. So company 's need to be prepared for a changing tide , because 
there may come a day where fellow industry members may support a given decision but 
customers do not. 
Lastly , the government is not the same as it was when this issue was in the spotlight in 
2016 . In February 2016 President Obama sided with the intelligence community on the issue of 
whether or not Apple should help the FBI, but saw that there was the potential for harm in doing 
so. 
54 In contrast , then Candidate Trump called for a boycott of Apple products. Candidate 
Trump is now President Trump and Republicans now have control of both the House and 
Senate. Companies who are trying to make the decision of whether or not be responsible for 
helping protect national security are facing a very different political climate than when the issue 
was a hot topic. For companies in the private sector all this means is that they need to know and 
under stand who they will be up against , no matter what side of the issue they come down on. 
They need to under stand that the next time this issue comes up it will probably end up before 
the Supreme Court or Congress. 
b. If the status quo stays the same ... 
If the status quo stays the same and the private sector is not held liable for helping to protect 
national security , then the intelligence community will have to turn to third paiiies or one of their 
54 Machkovech - Mar 11, 2016 10:35 pm UTC , Sam. "Obama weighs in on Apple v. FBI: "You ca n' t take an 
absolutist view"." Ars Technica. March 11, 2016. Accessed May 05 , 2017. hLtps://a rstechnica.co m/tec h-
pol icy/ 20 I 6/03/o bama -weighs-i 11-011-apple-v-fbi -yo u-can t-take-a n-absol utist-v iew/ . 
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1,931 private companies to get needed information. 55 A prime example is the San Bernardino 
case, the only reason that the case was dropped was because Apple found someone else to unlock 
the phone. So, that also means that the technology that Apple did not want to create for fear of it 
getting misused by the government , is technology that the government now has. This means that 
Apple will need to either once again upgrade its encryption software or try to now compel the 
FBI to turn over the software that gave them access to the phone. From there Apple will have to 
re-adapt its own software . In other words, the situation has now evolved from both Apple and the 
FBI standing outside the locked door to just Apple standing outside the locked door of getting 
customers infmmation. Now Apple will have to spend time , spend money, and re-task valuable 
researc h and development perso1mel so that Apple can relock the door and keep government out 
of reach of the key that it has worked so long and hard to try and keep out of rea ch of the 
intelligence community and itself. 
c) If the status quo changes ... 
If the status quo changes and companies are held responsible for helping protect national 
security then they will face an entirely different set of problems. As a result of the change 
companies will be forced to either hand over their technolog y or create technology when ordered 
to do so by the comts. This mean s handing over technology that could be leaked to other 
companies, thu s losing its value - or it could mean giving government blanket access to every 
phone in the country; which then gives the intelligence conununity the potential for misusing the 
teclmology. If this occurs it will force companies to spend the time to create new softwa re or 
spend the time creating software that will only give the intelli gence community access to one 
55 Prie st, Dana , and Willi am Ark in . "A Hidden World Growing Out of Contro l." The Washington Post. 2010. 
Acce ssed May 03 , 2017. http: //p r~jects .washin gtonpost. com / top-sec ret-america/articl es/a- hidd en-wor ld-g rowing -
beyond-control/2. 
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phone. In order to do this and comply with a given comi order companies will either spend 
significant amounts of their own research and development budgets or wait to be reimbursed by 
the government. No matter what the private sector would be significantly impacted by a change 
of the status quo and companies need to be aware of the impact s that those changes would have 
now, before the status quo changes. In other words, the best defense is a good offense, no matter 
what side of the issue a given member of the private sector falls on companies must try and stay 
ahead of the curve when it comes to the issue of who is responsible for protecting national 
security. 
PART SIX: PERSONAL REFLECTION AND AUTHORS BIOGRAPHY 
When I first staiied this project I literally had no idea what I was getting myself into. At 
the point that I was first starting my project I was ju st finishing my scholar semester for the 
Huntsman Scholars Program. Due to my participation in the program I was in teams writing long 
papers and doing extensive research, so I thought doing one on my own would not be so bad, and 
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doing own on the topic of my choosing meant that it would be even easier than a Scholars 
project. I could not have been more wrong. 
Writing my honors thesis has been one of the most challenging things I have done in my 
academic career. It has also been one of the most rewarding things that I have ever done in my 
academic career. The experience that I gained from writing something of this magnitude was 
something that I never expected to get out of my college education. When I was a freshman I 
never thought that I would be sitting here writing this reflection . 
Now let me tell you a little bit about my thesis. When I set out to try and pick a topic for 
my thesis I knew that I wanted it to be cross disciplinary and I knew that I wanted it to involve 
national security. What I didn ' t know was the struggle that I would face trying to pick a topic. At 
this point picking my topic wasn't a priority , unfo11unately like most college students it wasn't 
on my radar until about a week before it was due. At this point I reached out to my now mentor 
Dr. Shannon Peterson. I do have to say that choosing Dr. Peterson as my mentor and Professor 
Ferguson as my committee member was by far the easiest pai1 of my project. Doctor Peterson sat 
me down and walked me through my ideas to help find a common thread that I could put 
together for a topic. 
Once we figured out my topic all I then had to do was right it. Let me pause now to give 
my first piece of advice to anyone who is currently in the position of trying to write an honors 
thesis. Think about how long it will take you to complete your thesis ... then triple it. It always 
looks so much easier at the outset. Because my thesis is primarily literary based I needed sources 
and a lot of them. Some sources were easy to find and some were not so easy, but make sure if 
your project was literai·y based like mine was give yourself enough time to get into the material. 
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I did not start writing my thesis until pretty late in the game, and it would have been a lot 
less stressful for everyone involved if I had been writing as I went. What is that saying, do as I 
say not as I do. Please don' t make the same mistakes I did. The other mistake that I made in 
writing my thesis was that up until the day before it was due I wasn't writing my thesis for me. 
Sure , I was passionate about my topic and everything but I was not writing my thesis for me. I 
was writing it to graduate with honors. I was so scared that it wasn ' t going to be good enough. I 
was so scared that it wasn't adequate to have my committee members ' names on it that it almost 
paraly zed me , and I honestly almost didn 't finish. I wasn 't writing it for me, I was writing it be 
perfect. In reply to an email that I sent to my mentor in almost total panic she told me that 
ultimately my thesis was something that I needed to be proud of. That was the moment that had 
you been with me you would have seen the light bulb go on over my head. I realized that I had 
to do this for myself, I had to finish it for myself , and have it be meaningful and successful for 
me. 
In that moment, I went from wanting to rewrite the entire thing for a third time (at that 
point I had rewritten almost every part twice) to taking a step back and looking at the totality of 
what I had written rather than looking at it piece meal, and being overwhelmed with what I had 
accomplished. That day and into the next I made last edits on my thesi s, and I could honestly not 
be prouder of my final product. I have no doubt that my thesis is not perfect, but it is perfect for 
me. 
If I could tell a student who is considering writing a thesis any two pieces of advice it 
would be these . If you are considering doing an honors thesis, do it, it is well worth your time; if 
you are writing it for yourse lf. And find a good mentor , I can honestly say that this project would 
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not be completed without Dr. Peterson. Dr. Peterson if you are reading this, thank you! There is 
no way I could have done this without you. 
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